<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/git/stable/linux.git/arch/s390, branch master</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=master</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=master'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:41+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Enable CONTEXT_ANALYSIS</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Heiko Carstens</name>
<email>hca@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-31T08:38:38+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=dc2136341be9835e70ba7c6b36904cf3683fd029'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dc2136341be9835e70ba7c6b36904cf3683fd029</id>
<content type='text'>
Enable CONTEXT_ANALYSIS since s390's crypto code compiles now without
warnings.

Reviewed-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Map EBUSY to EIO when key conversion fails repeatedly</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
<email>freude@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-31T08:38:37+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=7a08507ea5b4d06ad8d269287913573f34467565'/>
<id>urn:sha1:7a08507ea5b4d06ad8d269287913573f34467565</id>
<content type='text'>
When hardware persistently returns -EBUSY after exhausting retries,
the error propagates to crypto_finalize_*_request(). The crypto API's
completion wrapper treats -EBUSY as a queueing status and swallows it,
preventing the completion callback from firing. This causes callers
using crypto_wait_req() to block indefinitely.

Translate persistent -EBUSY to -EIO after retry exhaustion to ensure
proper error propagation and callback invocation.

Fixes: 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler &lt;dengler@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16+
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Fix wrong return code to engine in asynch callbacks</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
<email>freude@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-31T08:38:36+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ac1481320110b803ab9b79ab4d2ca11a74fc05f2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ac1481320110b803ab9b79ab4d2ca11a74fc05f2</id>
<content type='text'>
When crypto_finalize_hash_request() or
crypto_finalize_skcipher_request() explicitly completes a request, the
do_one_request callback must return 0 to indicate successful
handling. Returning a negative error code causes the crypto engine to
assume the driver failed to take ownership and triggers a second
completion via crypto_request_complete(), resulting in a double
completion. This pattern occurs in paes_s390.c 4 times and once in
phmac_s390.c.

Fixed in phmac_do_one_request() and all four paes do_one_request
callbacks (ecb, cbc, ctr, xts) by returning 0 after explicit
finalization instead of propagating the error code.

Fixes: 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler &lt;dengler@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16+
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PHMAC when req is pushed to crypto engine</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
<email>freude@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-31T08:38:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=330148371401de474b656eaf521861f12ec1a1ce'/>
<id>urn:sha1:330148371401de474b656eaf521861f12ec1a1ce</id>
<content type='text'>
When a request is transferred to the engine via
crypto_transfer_hash_request_to_engine() there are two return codes
signaling a successful transfer: EINPROGRESS and EBUSY. However the
correct handling of EBUSY was missing and has been added as a return
code indicating a successful transfer to the crypto engine.

Fixes: cbbc675506cc ("crypto: s390 - New s390 specific protected key hash phmac")
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler &lt;dengler@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.17+
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Fix handling of EBUSY in PAES when req is pushed to crypto engine</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
<email>freude@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-31T08:38:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=3fec882c33d9b61983ee31456777f623dccd1a35'/>
<id>urn:sha1:3fec882c33d9b61983ee31456777f623dccd1a35</id>
<content type='text'>
When a request is transferred to the engine via
crypto_transfer_skcipher_request_to_engine() there are two return
codes signaling a successful transfer: EINPROGRESS and EBUSY. However
the correct handling of EBUSY was missing and has been added as a
return code indicating a successful transfer to the crypto engine.

Fixes: 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler &lt;dengler@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16+
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Fix missing cra_flags in paes_s390</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
<email>freude@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-31T08:38:33+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=5b97b969030c099333d973be420edef0d6452e0f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:5b97b969030c099333d973be420edef0d6452e0f</id>
<content type='text'>
The 4 algorithms implemented in paes_s390 never had any cra_flags
set. So add code which sets the cra_flag to CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC and
CRYPTO_ALG_NO_FALLBACK.

Fixes: 4ccd065a69df ("crypto: ahash - Add support for drivers with no fallback")
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler &lt;dengler@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.17+
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Fix use of mutex in atomic context in PAES</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
<email>freude@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-31T08:38:32+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=749990db95d45cc3d96aab999ac7f110259b200c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:749990db95d45cc3d96aab999ac7f110259b200c</id>
<content type='text'>
The PAES CTR implementation used a mutex to lock one page of exclusive
memory for fast CTR processing. Unfortunately a mutex is not save to
use in atomic or interrupt context. So use a binary semaphore instead
which is save to use in such environments.

Furthermore rework the code to get rid of conditional locking. So
restructure the PAES CRT code by extracting the main loop into a
separate function and just give in information about the (locked) page
can be used or not (is not locked).

Fixes: 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler &lt;dengler@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16+
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Fix missing scrub of temp buffers with PAES algorithm</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
<email>freude@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-31T08:38:31+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=19a218b46b2471d370c11fb52040f36ac8d05d23'/>
<id>urn:sha1:19a218b46b2471d370c11fb52040f36ac8d05d23</id>
<content type='text'>
In function ctr_paes_do_crypt() there is a buffer used to process
remaining bytes &lt; AES_BLOCK_SIZE. This buffer was not scrubbed and
thus could lead to expose of unwanted data. Rework the code to
explicitly scrub the buffer at the end of the function to avoid
exposure of maybe sensitive data.

In function __xts_2keys_prep_param() change the existing scrub to
clean the whole param block instead of just the key field.

Fixes: 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler &lt;dengler@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16+
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Fix return code handling at skcipher_walk_done in PAES algorithms</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:41+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
<email>freude@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-31T08:38:30+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=403648373816ae8eb76fe4a393836b0d65fa8f85'/>
<id>urn:sha1:403648373816ae8eb76fe4a393836b0d65fa8f85</id>
<content type='text'>
All the 4 PAES cipher processing loops were not checking the return
value of skcipher_walk_done() immediately after calling it. This could
lead to error masking when both the walk operation failed and a
subsequent key conversion was needed (k &lt; n condition).

Add immediate error checks after skcipher_walk_done() in all main
processing loops (ECB, CBC, CTR, XTS modes) to ensure walk errors are
properly propagated and not masked by subsequent operations.

With that comes a slight rework around the skcipher_walk_done()
invocation. It is now necessary to check if the walk has already been
finalized (walk-&gt;nbytes is then 0) or not to avoid double
de-allocation of resources held by the walk.

Fixes: 6cd87cb5ef6c ("s390/crypto: Rework protected key AES for true asynch support")
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler &lt;dengler@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.16+
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>s390/crypto: Fix use of mutex in atomic context</title>
<updated>2026-09-08T13:53:40+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Harald Freudenberger</name>
<email>freude@linux.ibm.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-31T08:37:35+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=d1c44a7d085473173bb360b7218a43699c3f56c7'/>
<id>urn:sha1:d1c44a7d085473173bb360b7218a43699c3f56c7</id>
<content type='text'>
The AES CTR implementation used a mutex to lock one page of exclusive
memory for fast CTR processing. Unfortunately a mutex is not save to
use in atomic or interrupt context. So use a binary semaphore instead
which is save to use in such environments.

Furthermore rework the code to get rid of conditional locking. So
restructure the AES CRT code by extracting the main loop into a
separate function and just give in information about the (locked) page
can be used or not (is not locked).

Fixes: 7988fb2c03c8 ("crypto: s390/aes - convert to skcipher API")
Suggested-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger &lt;freude@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler &lt;dengler@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.5+
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens &lt;hca@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik &lt;gor@linux.ibm.com&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
