<feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom'>
<title>kernel/git/stable/linux.git/fs, branch linux-5.10.y</title>
<subtitle>Linux kernel stable tree</subtitle>
<id>https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.10.y</id>
<link rel='self' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/atom?h=linux-5.10.y'/>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/'/>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:26:43+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>nilfs2: reject invalid block index in GC ioctl</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:26:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ryusuke Konishi</name>
<email>konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-26T10:57:42+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=898404cdf882d7b54f1132f75570984ca3214796'/>
<id>urn:sha1:898404cdf882d7b54f1132f75570984ca3214796</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit a1735eae55448bc79c2da6593455791e886f6ed8 ]

Syzbot reported list corruption caused by a double list_add_tail() call on
bh-&gt;b_assoc_buffers within nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers().

Analysis revealed that the root cause was the insertion of a page/folio
with a page index of ULONG_MAX into the page cache via the GC ioctl.
filemap_get_folios_tag(), called by nilfs_lookup_dirty_data_buffers(),
repeatedly detects a dirty folio with a page index of ULONG_MAX due to
index wrap-around, leading to duplicate processing of dirty buffers.

As a preparatory step, the GC ioctl loads the page/folio of the block to
be moved during GC and inserts it into the page cache based on information
in the nilfs_vdesc structure passed as an argument.  Normally, this does
not cause issues because the user-space GC library configures the
nilfs_vdesc structure properly.  However, since there is no range check on
the parameters determining the page index, a request with artificially
crafted parameters -- such as those generated by Syzbot -- can result in a
page/folio being inserted with a page index of ULONG_MAX, triggering the
above problem.

This resolves the issue by checking the ranges of 'vd_offset' and
'vd_vblocknr' in the nilfs_vdesc structure that determine the page index,
thereby preventing the invalid page/folio insertions.

Reported-by: syzbot+c37bed40868932d790e9@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=c37bed40868932d790e9
Fixes: 7942b919f732 ("nilfs2: ioctl operations")
Cc: wuyankun &lt;wuyankun@uniontech.com&gt;
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ryusuke Konishi &lt;konishi.ryusuke@gmail.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Viacheslav Dubeyko &lt;slava@dubeyko.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: propagate errors from fast commit range replay</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:26:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Guanghui Yang</name>
<email>3497809730@qq.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-26T10:57:17+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ffce4ec2e5cc26c8af61046c77602f12e1b34d8b'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ffce4ec2e5cc26c8af61046c77602f12e1b34d8b</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit d8b8dd3530bf41e14b118702cdaf9de64bb96885 ]

ext4_fc_replay() stops replaying fast commit tags only when a tag
handler returns a negative error. However, ext4_fc_replay_add_range()
and ext4_fc_replay_del_range() currently return 0 from their common
exit paths even after internal failures.

This hides errors from ext4_fc_record_modified_inode(),
ext4_map_blocks(), ext4_find_extent(), ext4_ext_insert_extent(),
ext4_ext_replay_update_ex(), and ext4_ext_remove_space(). As a result,
a failed ADD_RANGE or DEL_RANGE replay can be treated as successful and
the replay code may continue with subsequent fast commit tags.

This is particularly problematic for DEL_RANGE because it may already
have marked blocks as free before ext4_ext_remove_space() fails. If the
error is swallowed, replay may continue from a partially applied range
operation.

Return the saved error from the common exit paths and make the
ERR_PTR() cases in ADD_RANGE store PTR_ERR() before jumping to out.

Fixes: 8016e29f4362 ("ext4: fast commit recovery path")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Guanghui Yang &lt;3497809730@qq.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/tencent_E3622146846A84C75C31C7D32AC4D5AD0605@qq.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>Revert "smb: client: use kvzalloc() for megabyte buffer in simple fallocate"</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:26:43+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Sasha Levin</name>
<email>sashal@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-30T15:08:21+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=69d2adc8d9c9513b4f62fc7b41ea53bb10a0f8a2'/>
<id>urn:sha1:69d2adc8d9c9513b4f62fc7b41ea53bb10a0f8a2</id>
<content type='text'>
This reverts commit a0c4a3e5387421ae252126a7bc29f3cd95b3cf06.

Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jfs: add check read-only before txBeginAnon() call</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:26:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kovalev</name>
<email>kovalev@altlinux.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-24T14:49:13+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=97ac32b08442f5327867ad7d70d6ac6ebaa2a41a'/>
<id>urn:sha1:97ac32b08442f5327867ad7d70d6ac6ebaa2a41a</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 0176e69743ecc02961f2ae1ea42439cd2bf9ed58 ]

Added a read-only check before calling `txBeginAnon` in `extAlloc`
and `extRecord`. This prevents modification attempts on a read-only
mounted filesystem, avoiding potential errors or crashes.

Call trace:
 txBeginAnon+0xac/0x154
 extAlloc+0xe8/0xdec fs/jfs/jfs_extent.c:78
 jfs_get_block+0x340/0xb98 fs/jfs/inode.c:248
 __block_write_begin_int+0x580/0x166c fs/buffer.c:2128
 __block_write_begin fs/buffer.c:2177 [inline]
 block_write_begin+0x98/0x11c fs/buffer.c:2236
 jfs_write_begin+0x44/0x88 fs/jfs/inode.c:299

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+4e89b5368baba8324e07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e89b5368baba8324e07
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev &lt;kovalev@altlinux.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp &lt;dave.kleikamp@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>jfs: add check read-only before truncation in jfs_truncate_nolock()</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:26:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Vasiliy Kovalev</name>
<email>kovalev@altlinux.org</email>
</author>
<published>2024-12-24T14:49:14+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=b98506e61e1bb6764c6711198cfab826df8ca952'/>
<id>urn:sha1:b98506e61e1bb6764c6711198cfab826df8ca952</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit b5799dd77054c1ec49b0088b006c9908e256843b ]

Added a check for "read-only" mode in the `jfs_truncate_nolock`
function to avoid errors related to writing to a read-only
filesystem.

Call stack:

block_write_begin() {
  jfs_write_failed() {
    jfs_truncate() {
      jfs_truncate_nolock() {
        txEnd() {
          ...
          log = JFS_SBI(tblk-&gt;sb)-&gt;log;
          // (log == NULL)

If the `isReadOnly(ip)` condition is triggered in
`jfs_truncate_nolock`, the function execution will stop, and no
further data modification will occur. Instead, the `xtTruncate`
function will be called with the "COMMIT_WMAP" flag, preventing
modifications in "read-only" mode.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reported-by: syzbot+4e89b5368baba8324e07@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e89b5368baba8324e07
Signed-off-by: Vasiliy Kovalev &lt;kovalev@altlinux.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Dave Kleikamp &lt;dave.kleikamp@oracle.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>ext4: don't enable DAX on new encrypted files</title>
<updated>2026-09-02T12:26:42+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Eric Biggers</name>
<email>ebiggers@kernel.org</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-27T03:40:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=add98959b220935b243170214c787bc03044a44d'/>
<id>urn:sha1:add98959b220935b243170214c787bc03044a44d</id>
<content type='text'>
commit da32af420d6d466e247c43ac0b829edeac7ae0ad upstream.

Currently, when a new encrypted regular file is created, the call to
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true) in __ext4_new_inode() is made
before EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT is set.  As a result, it can set S_DAX if the
filesystem is mounted with "-o dax=always".

EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT then actually gets set a bit later in
__ext4_new_inode(), when it calls fscrypt_set_context() which calls
ext4_set_context().  ext4_set_context() sets EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT and
calls ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=false) to set S_ENCRYPTED too.

This was intended to clear S_DAX as well.  However, this was broken by
commit 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load").  This
causes data written to the file to bypass encryption, also causing
xfstests failures such as generic/548 (when "-o dax=always" is used).

Fix this by simplifying the flow by making __ext4_new_inode() set
EXT4_INODE_ENCRYPT earlier.  This makes it take effect in
ext4_set_inode_flags(inode, init=true), making S_DAX never be set.

Similarly, make EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA never be set in the first
place on new encrypted inodes.  Then it doesn't need to be cleared.

As a result of these simplifications, ext4_set_context() no longer needs
to change inode flags or state when 'handle != NULL'.  Remove that too.

Reported-by: Disha Goel &lt;disgoel@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reported-by: Ojaswin Mujoo &lt;ojaswin@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260723085648.1500357-1-ojaswin@linux.ibm.com
Fixes: 043546e46dc7 ("fs/ext4: Only change S_DAX on inode load")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers &lt;ebiggers@kernel.org&gt;
Tested-by: Disha Goel &lt;disgoel@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Ojaswin Mujoo &lt;ojaswin@linux.ibm.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Jan Kara &lt;jack@suse.cz&gt;
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260730175212.36923-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o &lt;tytso@mit.edu&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>iomap: adjust read range correctly for non-block-aligned positions</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:27:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Joanne Koong</name>
<email>joannelkoong@gmail.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-20T17:03:07+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=ce20f49ac9194cf81a77f01d1c316d7c17ae753c'/>
<id>urn:sha1:ce20f49ac9194cf81a77f01d1c316d7c17ae753c</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 7aa6bc3e8766990824f66ca76c19596ce10daf3e ]

iomap_adjust_read_range() assumes that the position and length passed in
are block-aligned. This is not always the case however, as shown in the
syzbot generated case for erofs. This causes too many bytes to be
skipped for uptodate blocks, which results in returning the incorrect
position and length to read in. If all the blocks are uptodate, this
underflows length and returns a position beyond the folio.

Fix the calculation to also take into account the block offset when
calculating how many bytes can be skipped for uptodate blocks.

Signed-off-by: Joanne Koong &lt;joannelkoong@gmail.com&gt;
Tested-by: syzbot@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster &lt;bfoster@redhat.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner &lt;brauner@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Miguel Gazquez (Schneider Electric) &lt;miguel.gazquez@bootlin.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:27:35+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Ibrahim Hashimov</name>
<email>security@auditcode.ai</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-15T07:17:23+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=acb4e26295e7f0e685815a3fd3d70bd8329cefa1'/>
<id>urn:sha1:acb4e26295e7f0e685815a3fd3d70bd8329cefa1</id>
<content type='text'>
commit 813f8136a2ce1fee266d02a7df73db6e8a541604 upstream.

xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() replays each dirty region described by a
buffer log item's bitmap into the buffer read for that item:

	memcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp, (uint)bit &lt;&lt; XFS_BLF_SHIFT),
		item-&gt;ri_buf[i].iov_base,
		nbits &lt;&lt; XFS_BLF_SHIFT);

The destination offset (bit/nbits, from the logged dirty bitmap) and the
buffer size (from the logged blf_len) are both attacker-controlled and
otherwise unrelated, yet the only thing bounding the copy is an ASSERT(),
which compiles away on production kernels. A crafted image logging a
small blf_len together with a bitmap bit past the end of that buffer
drives the memcpy() past the buffer's allocation, corrupting adjacent
kernel heap during mount-time log recovery. This is reachable by anyone
who can get a crafted image mounted -- the malicious-filesystem threat
model XFS already guards against elsewhere.

Turn the ASSERT() into a real XFS_IS_CORRUPT() check that aborts recovery
of the buffer with -EFSCORRUPTED, consistent with the validate-and-fail
idiom already used in xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer() and
xfs_dquot_item_recover.c. xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() therefore becomes
STATIC int and its three callers propagate the error.

Found and confirmed with KASAN on a CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG=n build: the crafted
image trips a slab-out-of-bounds write before this change and fails
recovery cleanly with -EFSCORRUPTED after it.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Ibrahim Hashimov &lt;security@auditcode.ai&gt;
Reviewed-by: "Darrick J. Wong" &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Reviewed-by: Brian Foster &lt;bfoster@redhat.com&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: fix ilock leak on error in xfs_dq_get_next_id</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:27:34+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Long Li</name>
<email>leo.lilong@huawei.com</email>
</author>
<published>2026-08-23T18:03:59+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=e4c05ebd01e910bccd4f7e9517c7353982e27763'/>
<id>urn:sha1:e4c05ebd01e910bccd4f7e9517c7353982e27763</id>
<content type='text'>
[ Upstream commit 63320a0f70f66f311f4bccff3af0719c2119f46c ]

xfs_dq_get_next_id() takes the quota inode ILOCK before calling
xfs_iread_extents().  If xfs_iread_extents() fails, the function returns
immediately without releasing the lock, leaking the quota inode ILOCK.
This can leave the quota inode locked and cause subsequent quota
operations to hang.

Fix this by jumping to a common unlock path on error instead of returning
directly.

Fixes: bda250dbaf39f ("xfs: rewrite xfs_dq_get_next_id using xfs_iext_lookup_extent")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v4.12
Signed-off-by: Long Li &lt;leo.lilong@huawei.com&gt;
Reviewed-by: Christoph Hellwig &lt;hch@lst.de&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin &lt;sashal@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>xfs: validate attr entry pointer before field access</title>
<updated>2026-08-27T12:27:33+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Hongling Zeng</name>
<email>zenghongling@kylinos.cn</email>
</author>
<published>2026-07-28T07:43:40+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://git.landau.one/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/commit/?id=0f82586741e39926542f621bafa424e237a04fa4'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0f82586741e39926542f621bafa424e237a04fa4</id>
<content type='text'>
commit b7eea80be25f3334f131d52982b3131aba77b97d upstream.

xfs_attr3_leaf_verify_entry() accesses lentry/rentry fields (namelen,
valuelen) before checking if the entry pointer itself is within bounds.
If nameidx is crafted to point near the end of the buffer, these field
accesses can read out-of-bounds before the bounds check at
name_end &gt; buf_end is performed.

Add explicit bounds checks for entry pointers before accessing their
fields. Use offsetof() to check that the start of the flexible array
member (nameval/name) is within bounds, which ensures all preceding
fields are safe to access.

Fixes: c84760659dcf2 ("xfs: check attribute leaf block structure")
Cc: &lt;stable@vger.kernel.org&gt; # v5.5
Signed-off-by: Hongling Zeng &lt;zenghongling@kylinos.cn&gt;
Reviewed-by: Darrick J. Wong &lt;djwong@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Carlos Maiolino &lt;cem@kernel.org&gt;
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman &lt;gregkh@linuxfoundation.org&gt;
</content>
</entry>
</feed>
