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| author | Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com> | 2026-07-28 17:54:56 +0500 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org> | 2026-09-01 12:15:16 +0200 |
| commit | 28a289beaf226b30b1e6e7d7b1a2946fe2d6e852 (patch) | |
| tree | 6c0e0f16687b86d470a36d20dc15025198c295a5 /scripts/Makefile.thinlto | |
| parent | ff917923f4fb9c83717ba135ee47d7e4c1567bb7 (diff) | |
| download | linux-28a289beaf226b30b1e6e7d7b1a2946fe2d6e852.tar.gz linux-28a289beaf226b30b1e6e7d7b1a2946fe2d6e852.zip | |
staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in rtw_restruct_wmm_ie()
rtw_restruct_wmm_ie() scans in_ie for a WMM IE with:
while (i < in_len) {
...
if (i + 5 < in_len && in_ie[i] == 0xDD && ...) {
...
break;
}
i += (in_ie[i + 1] + 2); /* to the next IE element */
}
When the "i + 5 < in_len" match check fails simply because i is
within 5 bytes of the end of the buffer (i.e. no WMM IE was found
near the tail of in_ie), execution falls through to
"i += (in_ie[i + 1] + 2)", which reads in_ie[i + 1]. If i == in_len
- 1 at that point, this is a 1-byte out-of-bounds read of an
attacker-influenced IE buffer built from association/scan data.
Commit a75281626fc8f ("staging: rtl8723bs: fix potential
out-of-bounds read in rtw_restruct_wmm_ie") added the "i + 5 <
in_len" guard to the match condition itself, but did not add an
equivalent guard before the fallthrough advance, so the same class
of OOB read remained reachable through the non-matching path.
Add an explicit bounds check before advancing to the next IE.
Fixes: 554c0a3abf216 ("staging: Add rtl8723bs sdio wifi driver")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Muhammad Bilal <meatuni001@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260728125456.32359-4-meatuni001@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'scripts/Makefile.thinlto')
0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions
