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# Conflicts:
# net/ceph/osd_client.c
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux.git
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd.git
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux.git
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https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm.git
# Conflicts:
# include/linux/ns/ns_common_types.h
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landlock_merge_ruleset() checks for a NULL ruleset after dereferencing
it in lockdep_assert_held(). Move the assertion after the check so the
defensive path remains effective.
The mask-validation comment originated in landlock_add_fs_access_mask()
to explain that its WARN_ON_ONCE() checked a caller invariant. It
became self-referential when this helper and its network and scope
counterparts were inlined into landlock_create_ruleset(). Restate the
invariant without naming the caller.
Keep both as defensive callee checks. Moving the assertion preserves
the NULL check's ability to warn and return -EINVAL, while invalid masks
remain warned about and masked.
Reported-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Closes: https://patch.msgid.link/aobYhIt3vcs2xN0b@google.com
Closes: https://patch.msgid.link/aobasxUDQ8b7GYXl@google.com
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260907103609.113325-1-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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current_check_refer_path() reads old_dentry->d_parent without holding a
reference nor a lock on it, and then dereferences it in
collect_domain_accesses() and in the audit record.
A reference on a child does not pin its parent: __d_move() reassigns
dentry->d_parent and drops the reference the child held on its former
parent. hook_path_rename() is not affected because the rename path
calls lock_rename() before the hook, so the source cannot be reparented
under it. hook_path_link() has no such protection: filename_linkat()
holds a reference on the source dentry but neither locks nor references
its parent, so a concurrent rename(2) can reparent the source while
security_path_link() runs, and the former parent can then be removed and
freed while the hook walks it.
A process can trigger this after entering a Landlock domain that handles
at least one filesystem access right. The process can then race a
linkat(2) loop against rename(2) and rmdir(2):
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in collect_domain_accesses+0x278/0x290
Read of size 4 at addr ffff888160bd53f4 by task llrepro2/549
collect_domain_accesses+0x278/0x290
current_check_refer_path+0x952/0x1120
security_path_link+0x1be/0x320
filename_linkat+0x342/0x6d0
__x64_sys_linkat+0xfa/0x150
Freed by task 562:
kmem_cache_free+0x139/0x4c0
i_callback+0x4b/0x80
rcu_core+0x7dc/0x10a0
Take a reference on the dentry selected as the source parent, using
dget() for the common-mount-root case and dget_parent() otherwise.
Release it after the hierarchy walk and synchronous audit logging.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: b91c3e4ea756 ("landlock: Add support for file reparenting with LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_REFER")
Signed-off-by: Norbert Szetei <norbert@doyensec.com>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Günther Noack <gnoack3000@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/E9CDD9E6-E960-4DE2-B1AC-5667D52ABB3E@doyensec.com
[mic: Clarify the caller, reachability, and reference handling]
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Cross-merge BPF and other fixes after downstream PR.
Conflicts:
kernel/bpf/backtrack.c
include/linux/bpf_verifier.h
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux
Pull kmalloc_obj conversions from Kees Cook:
"Another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc()
family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules
in scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci"
* tag 'kmalloc_obj-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/kees/linux:
treewide: refresh kmalloc_obj() conversions
drm/amd/display: Fix harmless type mismatch in allocation
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This is another run of the Coccinelle script for converting kmalloc()
family of allocations to kmalloc_obj() via the existing rules in
scripts/coccinelle/api/kmalloc_objs.cocci
This catches both the set of kmalloc() uses added since the first
kmalloc_obj() conversions in v7.0 and adds a large group missed in the
first pass due to Coccinelle not interacting well with the cleanup.h
scoped_...() family of macros[1]. I worked around this with spatch's
"--macro-file" argument to a file with all the scoped_...() macros mapped
to Coccinelle's YACFE_ITERATOR[2] as that was the closest viable control
flow indicator I could find.
Build tested allmodconfig on x86, arm64, arm, loongarch, mips, powerpc,
riscv, and s390 with no new warnings.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/202609021314.8A9C0B8@keescook/ [1]
Link: https://github.com/coccinelle/coccinelle/blob/master/standard.h [2]
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees+treewide@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull IMA fixes from Mimi Zohar:
- Instantiating the ima_file_truncate and ima_path_truncate LSM hooks
resulted in configfs locking issues.
configfs files should not be measured, appraised, or audited in the
first place, so the builtin policies are updated to exclude them.
- IMA audit messages include the filename, which could result in a page
fault when the filename doesn't exist
- Un-hide the IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX Kconfig prompt
* tag 'integrity-v7.3-rc2' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: allow users to specify the pcr index with IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX
ima: Check for ERR_PTR from dentry_path() in validate_hash_algo()
ima: don't measure/appraise files on configfs
configfs: move CONFIGFS_MAGIC definition to magic.h
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The IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX option is currently not visible in the kconfig
frontend, so it always uses its default, 10. This means that the
'range 8 14' is dead code, and users are unable to specify the pcr index
value.
In a previous discussion, Mimi explained that users should be able to use
this config option to specify the pcr index. [1]
Let's add a prompt for users to specify the pcr index, when EXPERT is
enabled.
This dead range was found by kconfirm, a static analysis tool for Kconfig.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/1feff118-4afa-4b9c-86f1-271a7a88208f@gmail.com/T/#mc4efa2491b4937eb7c9e532c29ffba516a70e662 [1]
Signed-off-by: Julian Braha <julianbraha@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull SELinux fixes from Paul Moore:
"Two SELinux fixes: one to fix how we lookup a BPF token's creator
label to prevent a possible TOCTOU, and one to update Ondrej's email
address"
* tag 'selinux-pr-20260903' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
MAINTAINERS, mailmap: update email address for Ondrej Mosnáček
selinux: fix BPF token permission checks
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* dev:
selinux: remove unused mls_setup_user_range()
selinux: convert selinuxfs inode numbers from unsigned long to u64
selinux: tighten policydb_context_isvalid() checks
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dentry_path() returns ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG) when the path exceeds the
buffer. validate_hash_algo() passes the result straight to
integrity_audit_msg() without checking. ERR_PTR is not NULL, so
integrity_audit_message() sees a valid pointer and calls strlen() on
it, which faults:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffffffffffdc
RIP: 0010:strlen+0x30/0xa0
Call Trace:
audit_log_untrustedstring+0x19/0x30
integrity_audit_message+0x366/0x4f0
ima_inode_setxattr+0x512/0x5f0
Check for IS_ERR() and use NULL instead, which makes the audit message
skip the name= field instead of crashing.
Fixes: 4f2946aa0c45 ("IMA: introduce a new policy option func=SETXATTR_CHECK")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reported-by: syzbot+5ebeb3089ea6439c37be@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6a8f89e5.1d9ded08.62e62.00bf.GAE@google.com/
Signed-off-by: Bradley Morgan <brads@mainlining.org>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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IMA measurement of a configfs file causes process_measurement() to hold
iint->mutex while performing a kernel_read() to hash it, which re-enters
configfs's own file locking (buffer->mutex, frag_sem).
Separately, opening any file with O_TRUNC now causes ima_file_truncate()
to take iint->mutex to reset the cached action flags, while sb_writers is
already held for that mount.
When a configfs-backed nvmet namespace is involved, these two independent
lock chains combine into a cycle:
iint->mutex -> configfs locks -> subsys->lock -> sb_writers -> iint->mutex
Add configfs to the builtin don't measure/appraise rules, similarly to
other pseudo file systems, so IMA never takes iint->mutex for configfs
file in the first place.
Reported-by: syzbot+448c2e24b1ceff13ed2a@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/6a77c7cd.b50370da.49fe0.0031.GAE@google.com/
Suggested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Frederick Lawler <fred@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>
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Currently randstruct does not support rust so we have Kconfig dependencies
which prevent rust being enabled when randstruct is. Unfortunately this
prevents rust being enabled in allmodconfig, our standard coverage build.
randstruct gets turned on by default, then the dependency on !RANDSTRUCT
causes rust to get disabled.
Work around this by disabling randstruct by default if we have a usable
rust toolchain and rust support for the architecture, circular
dependencies prevent us directly depending on !RUST. This means we might
end up with a configuration that disables both rust and randstruct but
hopefully it's more likely go give the expected result.
Signed-off-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Miguel Ojeda <ojeda@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-rust-reverse-randstruct-dep-v4-1-3bfa19efe1fa@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <kees@kernel.org>
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request_key_auth_describe() prints rka->pid into /proc/keys as a raw
pid_t in the initial pid namespace. A reader can open /proc/keys through
a mount in another pid namespace. That reader sees a number with no
meaning there. The number can even name an unrelated task. The line
needs VIEW on the key. So the reader either shares the key owner's uid
or possesses the key.
The fix keeps a struct pid. Commit 4f82f45730c6 ("net ip6 flowlabel:
Make owner a union of struct pid * and kuid_t") gave
/proc/net/ip6_flowlabel the same storage. The print goes through
pid_nr_ns(). It renders against the pid namespace of the procfs instance
the line is read through. Commit ad08978ab41c ("ipv6/flowlabel: simplify
pid namespace lookup") moved that print to the same anchor. Output
through an initial namespace /proc does not change. The line shows 0 for
a requestor with no number in that namespace.
Translating at read time was the alternative. find_pid_ns() can resolve
a recycled number. The line would then name a live task with no
connection to the key. A stored struct pid gives 0 instead when the
requestor has no number there.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/keyrings/20260809110202.2180410-1-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com/
Fixes: 78b7280cce23 ("KEYS: Improve /proc/keys")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.10+
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 codeql
Signed-off-by: Maoyi Xie <maoyixie.tju@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260821095935.1864998-1-maoyixie.tju@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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clear_bit() is atomic with respect to the word it modifies, but it is
an unordered operation: it implies no memory barrier on either side
(Documentation/atomic_bitops.txt).
key_garbage_collector() clears KEY_GC_REAPING_KEYTYPE with clear_bit()
and calls wake_up_bit() after reaping a dead key type. wake_up_bit()
uses a lockless waitqueue check and requires a full barrier after the
clear.
The existing smp_mb() is before clear_bit(), so nothing orders the clear
against that check. The GC can see an empty waitqueue while
unregister_key_type() still sees the bit set. The final wakeup is then
lost, leaving module unload stuck in wait_on_bit().
Use clear_and_wake_up_bit(). Its clear_bit_unlock() has RELEASE
semantics, so the completed GC work stays ordered before the clear, and
its smp_mb__after_atomic() orders the clear before the waitqueue check.
Fixes: 0c061b5707ab ("KEYS: Correctly destroy key payloads when their keytype is removed")
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5
Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter <kmehltretter@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260821025327.61488-1-kmehltretter@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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I found the following path:
alloc_empty_backing-file
init_file(&ff->file, xxx)
-> file_ref_init(&f->f_ref, 1); // only 1
error = init_backing_file
-> security_backing_file_alloc
-> rc = call_int_hook(backing_file_alloc, ...)
if (unlikely(rc))
security_backing_file_free(backing_file); // first call
if (unlikely(error)) {
fput(&ff->file);
-> if (unlikely(file_ref_put(&file->f_ref))) // zero
__fput_deferred(file);
-> ____fput -> __fput -> file_free(file);
-> backing_file_free(backing_file(f));
-> security_backing_file_free(&ff->file); // second call
Currently, only SELinux has the lsm backing_file_alloc hook, and it always
return 0. When security_backing_file_free is called for the first time,
the blobs pointer is set to NULL. Therefore, double free will not occur in
the code.
Fixes: 6af36aeb147a ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks")
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
[PM: subject line tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Delete a duplicate assignment of the LSM blob size variable in
lsm_prepare().
Signed-off-by: Cai Xinchen <caixinchen1@huawei.com>
[PM: subject and description fixes]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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On 32-bit systems the newly added namespace fields in the
common_audit_data struct exceed the BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(void *) * 2)
size check in audit_log_lsm_data(). Convert the size check to two
u64 types to both fit the new fields and move to a size that is not
architecture dependent.
Fixes: bb20ca26f960 ("lsm: add LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NS for namespace audit records")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202608131232.Owej9tlx-lkp@intel.com/
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Add a new LSM audit data type LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NS that logs namespace
information in audit records. Two fields are provided:
- namespace_type: the CLONE_NEW* flag identifying the namespace type,
logged in hexadecimal.
- namespace_id: the unique 64-bit namespace identifier, retrievable
from userspace via NS_GET_ID or listns(2). Unlike the proc inode
number (inum), namespace_id is never recycled. For namespace creation
denials, namespace_id is 0 because the namespace does not exist yet.
A new audit data type is needed because no existing LSM_AUDIT_DATA_*
type carries namespace information. The closest alternatives (e.g.
LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK or LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE with custom strings) would
either lose the namespace type or require ad-hoc formatting that
bypasses the structured audit data union.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Reviewed-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
[PM: corrected audit fields in the description, subject tweaks]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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All namespace types now share the same ns_common infrastructure. Extend
this to include a security blob so LSMs can start managing namespaces
uniformly without having to add one-off hooks or security fields to
every individual namespace type.
Add a ns_security pointer to ns_common and the corresponding lbs_ns blob
size to lsm_blob_sizes. Allocation and freeing hooks are called from the
common __ns_common_init() and __ns_common_free() paths so every
namespace type gets covered in one go. All information about the
namespace type and the appropriate casting helpers to get at the
containing namespace are available via ns_common making it
straightforward for LSMs to differentiate when they need to.
A namespace_install hook is called from validate_ns() during setns(2)
giving LSMs a chance to enforce policy on namespace transitions. The
LSM check runs before ns->ops->install() so the security module can deny
the operation before any type-specific installation effects.
Individual namespace types can still have their own specialized security
hooks when needed. This is just the common baseline that makes it easy
to track and manage namespaces from the security side without requiring
every namespace type to reinvent the wheel.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: Serge E. Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260216-work-security-namespace-v1-1-075c28758e1f@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
[PM: subject tweak]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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The `cred` field in task_struct is currently marked as __rcu, but that's
not true: It can point to credentials from access_override_creds(), which
do not get freed with RCU delay.
What actually protects task_struct::cred is that accessing it is only
permitted for the current task (except for setting up a child during fork()
or tearing down a dead process).
(There is currently code in Smack that violates this rule, but that's a bug
and causes UAF, I have sent a separate fix for that.)
Clarify this, remove the __rcu marker, and remove RCU helpers from all
accesses to this field.
Signed-off-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
[PM: style tweak in security_init(), applied fixup from JH]
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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mls_setup_user_range() was a helper for security_get_user_sids(),
which was removed by commit ad1ac3d740cc6b8 ("selinux: prune
/sys/fs/selinux/user"). Since mls_setup_user_range() has no remaining
users, remove it too and any other helpers that only it was using.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Starting with commit 0b2600f81cef ("treewide: change inode->i_ino from
unsigned long to u64") inode numbers were changed from an 'unsigned long'
type to a 'u64' but somehow selinuxfs was lost in the conversion. This
patch corrects this oversight and converts selinuxfs to 'u64' inode
numbers.
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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policydb_context_isvalid() bounds each of user, role, and type but
does not require the value to be defined. A crafted policy can declare
more identifiers that it defines, so an initial SID or ocontext
context whose type is not defined can be inserted into the sidtab and
later reach type_attribute_bounds_av() from
context_struct_compute_av(), thereby reaching the
BUG_ON(!type_val_to_struct[type - 1]). A user with no datum can reach
context_struct_to_string() and thereby trigger strlen(NULL). The user
and role datums are already NULL-checked further down but only when
role is not OBJECT_R_VAL, so an object context can carry an undefined
value through.
Use policydb_{role,user,type}_isvalid(), which check both the range
and that the value has a name, in place of the inline range checks.
The name and datum arrays are populated by *_index(), so a value with
a name also has a datum. This runs after policydb_index(), so the
arrays are populated. The now-redundant NULL guards on role and
usrdatum in the OBJECT_R_VAL block can then be dropped.
Signed-off-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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Avoid multiple lookups of the bpffs creator SID using the token's file
descriptor when the same information can be found via the resolved
path/dentry (in selinux_bpf_token_create()) or the token itself (in
selinux_bpf_map_create() and selinux_bpf_prog_load()). Not only does
this simplify the code, it avoids potential TOCTOU issues if the user
changes the token file descriptor passed into the kernel.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 5473a722f782 ("selinux: add support for BPF token access control")
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Tested-by: Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
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BPF program signatures can currently be verified against one of the
system keyrings (builtin, secondary, platform) or against an arbitrary
user/session caller-supplied keyring named through keyring_id. There
is nothing in between: the system keyrings need a kernel rebuild or a
vouched-for enrollment to rotate a key, while a caller-supplied keyring
is fully controlled by the loader and therefore carries no trust on
its own (unless explicitly combined with BPF LSM to protect against
key tampering).
Add a dedicated bpf keyring to fill that gap, modelled after the
dm-verity keyring which was added in commit 033724b1c627 ("dm-verity:
add dm-verity keyring") and which can eventually be used also via
systemd [0] through the same enrollment method as in dm-verity's case.
It is selected with the new KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING special key id and
gives an operator a place to enroll a BPF-only signing key at boot,
specifically scoped to BPF program loading and nothing else in the
kernel's trust hierarchy.
The id is reserved from the KEY_SPEC space so that the latter is not
linked into any process keyring, and lookup_user_key() resolves
KEY_SPEC_BPF_KEYRING constant instead of having to look it up via
/proc/keys first.
By default the keyring is sealed empty at init. Systems that want to
provision keys pass bpf.keyring_unsealed=1, which leaves the keyring
open for the initrd to add keys to. The keyring is only ever consulted
once it is both non-empty and restricted. An unrestricted keyring is
ignored.
Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Link: https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/43549 [0]
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260828175227.1537793-2-daniel@iogearbox.net
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull TPM updates from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"The bulk of this is Ross Philipson's TPM enablement for Trenchboot.
That exposes TPM constants, and decouple and improve robustness of
tpm_buf a bit in order to implement a minimal early TPM driver.
Early boot code will call either SKINIT on AMD or GETSEC[SENTER] on
Intel before jumping into kernel's entry point. They re-initalize TPM
PCRs but leave up to the early boot code measure initrd, boot_params
and Trenchboot associated metadata.
The motivation here is just that we would want in future iterations of
the series put our full focus to the x86 part of the review, and call
it a day as per TPM changes. Further, even if Trenchboot turned out to
be empty lottery the worst possible outcome for TPM driver is that
things get cleaned up a bit"
* tag 'for-next-tpm-7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
tpm-buf: Add TPM buffer support header for standalone reuse
tpm-buf: Memory-safe allocations
tpm-buf: Remove chip parameter from tpm_buf_append_handle()
tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW
tpm: Remove main TPM header from TPM event log header
tpm: Move platform specific definitions to the new PTP header
tpm: Move TPM common base definitions to the command header
tpm: Move TPM2 specific definitions to the command header
tpm: Move TPM1 specific definitions to the command header
tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers
tpm: st33zp24: Validate locality read result
tpm: st33zp24: Return zero on status read failure
tpm: tpm_tis_spi: fix nodef CR50 tpm_tis_spi_resume is null
tpm: atmel: depend on X86
tpm: Remove redundant dev_err()
tpm: tpm_i2c_nuvoton: disable IRQ on wait timeout
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor
Pull AppArmor updates from John Johansen:
"The biggest functional change is Jann Horn's fix for how aparmor is
doing stale cred updates after a policy replacement.
apparmor: fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()
It moves the update to be done during task_work at the end of the
syscall.
One major feature is allowing policy to be compressed in userspace
instead of after the fact (in kernel) if we need to hold onto it for
CRIU/introspection.
The other major change is to do with network mediation. It is a lot of
code churn but does not do any functional changes to mediation. It
moves the code around, and refactors it to use newer patterns for
consistency, and in preparation for some improvements in mediation in
a future patchset.
Features:
- support loading compressed policies
- add audit mode to provide a mechanism to silence complain messages
- refactor network mediation to use new patterns, and prepare to for
extended inet mediation (no functional change)
Cleanups:
- switch website link to https
- make include headers self-contained, and fix circular include
- constify aa_label, aa_dfa, aa_profile, and aa_perms paraneters
- mark static tables and structs as read only
- drop use of _confined variant for iteration
- refactory mount to use check_perms
- refactor network mediation code to be together
- refactor xattr attachment, to take the file path
- optimize current_label_crit_section()
- leverage audit_log_n_untrustedstring() when possible
Bug Fixes:
- initialized policy lists heads before fail path
- fix deadlock in complain-mode change_hat
- auditing of mount binary data
- fix error debug output in fn_label_build
- fix race condition in label replacement
- fix unconfined user namespace restriction forced stack
- fix error handling for copy_from_user in policy_update
- fix out-of-bounds write when null terminating a label vec
- fix integer overflow in verify_tags() bounds check
- fix cred UAF caused by begin_current_label_crit_section()
- use SEND_SIG_NOINFO instead of NULL in aa_audit()"
* tag 'apparmor-pr-2026-08-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jj/linux-apparmor: (40 commits)
apparmor: policy_int make sure list heads are initialized before fail path
apparmor: fix deadlock in complain-mode change_hat
apparmor: constify aa_label parameters on read-only query helpers
apparmor: constify aa_dfa parameters on read-only compute paths
apparmor: constify aa_profile parameters on read-only compute paths
apparmor: constify aa_perms parameters that are read-only
apparmor: drop use of _confined variant for iteration
apparmor: refactory mount to use check_perms
apparmor: fix auditing of mount binary data
apparmor: add audit mode to provide a mechanism to silence complain messages
apparmor: mark static tables and structs as read only
apparmor: fix error debug output in fn_label_build
apparmor: make table entry count last enum for static tables
apparmor: fix race condition in label replacement
apparmor: refactor xattr attachment, to take the file path
apparmor: fix unconfined user namespace restriction forced stack
apparmor: reserve mediation class for packet mediation
apparmor: move sock_rcv_skb() next to inet_conn_request
apparmor: move netfilter functions next to the LSM network operations
apparmor: refactor network socket mediation to support compatibility
...
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If profile create fails before policy_init is complete the list heads
are not properly initialized causing profile_free() sanity checks to
trigger the following splat.
AppArmor WARN aa_policy_destroy: (((!list_empty(&policy->profiles) && (&policy->profiles)->prev != ((void *) 0x122 + (0xdead000000000000UL))))):
WARNING: security/apparmor/lib.c:509 at aa_policy_destroy+0x164/0x1b0 security/apparmor/lib.c:509, CPU#0: syz.0.17/5541
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5541 Comm: syz.0.17 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:aa_policy_destroy+0x16b/0x1b0 security/apparmor/lib.c:509
Code: 85 ed 7e 4d e8 96 bc 37 fd 5b 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d e9 19 27 4e 07 cc e8 83 bc 37 fd 48 8d 3d 0c f0 d3 0b 48 c7 c6 a4 eb 38 8e <67> 48 0f b9 3a e9 04 ff ff ff e8 66 bc 37 fd 48 8d 3d ff ef d3 0b
RSP: 0018:ffffc9000345eaa0 EFLAGS: 00010293
RAX: ffffffff848f530d RBX: ffff88803f734800 RCX: ffff88801af2a580
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff8e38eba4 RDI: ffffffff90634320
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000cc0 R09: 00000000ffffffff
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: fffffbfff1d95913 R12: dead000000000122
R13: ffff88803f734800 R14: ffff88803f734828 R15: dffffc0000000000
FS: 00007f5f6a1836c0(0000) GS:ffff88808c519000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 000055d02407b048 CR3: 0000000012aa9000 CR4: 0000000000352ef0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
aa_free_profile+0x9d/0x9f0 security/apparmor/policy.c:334
aa_alloc_profile+0x1e4/0x3e0 security/apparmor/policy.c:416
unpack_profile security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1153 [inline]
aa_unpack+0x17db/0x7430 security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c:1748
aa_replace_profiles+0x226/0x2a20 security/apparmor/policy.c:1183
policy_update+0x234/0x4a0 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:505
profile_load+0x1cb/0x320 security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c:522
vfs_write+0x296/0xba0 fs/read_write.c:685
ksys_write+0x150/0x270 fs/read_write.c:739
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:61 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f5f6939e0d9
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f5f6a183028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f5f69625fa0 RCX: 00007f5f6939e0d9
RDX: 0000000000000041 RSI: 0000200000000400 RDI: 0000000000000003
RBP: 00007f5f6a183090 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000001
R13: 00007f5f69626038 R14: 00007f5f69625fa0 R15: 00007ffe23725c18
Reported-by: syzbot+faed97c4ed43bfe7fee5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=faed97c4ed43bfe7fee5
Fixes: fe6bb31f590c9 ("apparmor: split out shared policy_XXX fns to lib")
Signed-off-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
|
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The security subsystem does not use the page cache. Removing just
the pagemap.h includes isn't quite enough to insulate it from changes to
pagemap as it's also pulled in by swap.h and hugetlb.h. Fortunately,
security doesn't need either of those so we can lose all three. Now
touching pagemap.h causes no rebuilds in the security subsystem.
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
|
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Decouple kzalloc from buffer creation, so that a managed allocation can be
used:
struct tpm_buf *buf __free(kfree) buf = kzalloc(TPM_BUFSIZE,
GFP_KERNEL);
if (!buf)
return -ENOMEM;
tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE);
Alternatively, other allocations are also possible (static data, stack,
etc) for example:
u8 buf_data[512];
struct tpm_buf *buf = (struct tpm_buf *)buf_data;
tpm_buf_init(buf, sizeof(buf_data));
This is achieved by embedding buffer's header inside the allocated blob,
instead of having an outer wrapper.
Reviewed-by: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Tested-by: Srish Srinivasan <ssrish@linux.ibm.com>
Message-ID: <20260522013555.1063716-1-jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@oracle.com>
|
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Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW flags into
the TPM_BUF_INVALID flag, as their behavior is identical (the only
difference being the associated log messages).
Message-ID: <20260125192526.782202-11-jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@opinsys.com>
Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell <noodles@meta.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
|
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Consolidate TPM1 constants in tpm_command.h and remove duplicate
constants from tpm1-cmd.c.
Co-developed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Co-developed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd
Pull TPM update from Jarkko Sakkinen:
"Just a single bug fix"
* tag 'for-next-keys-v7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jarkko/linux-tpmdd:
KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux
Pull Landlock update from Mickaël Salaün:
"This improves observability with Landlock tracepoints support, which
required some refactoring for dedicated domain types and common
helpers shared with audit code.
A LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS flag is also added to improve
process-wide domain enforcement consistency.
Whiteout files are now correctly handled and tested, and a few other
fixes"
* tag 'landlock-7.3-rc1' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/mic/linux: (34 commits)
landlock: Document tracepoints
selftests/landlock: Add landlock_enforce_domain trace tests
selftests/landlock: Add scope and ptrace tracepoint tests
selftests/landlock: Add network tracepoint tests
selftests/landlock: Add filesystem tracepoint tests
selftests/landlock: Add trace event test infrastructure and tests
landlock: Add tracepoints for ptrace and scope denials
landlock: Add landlock_deny_access_fs and landlock_deny_access_net
landlock: Add tracepoints for rule checking
landlock: Add landlock_enforce_domain tracepoint
landlock: Add create_domain and free_domain tracepoints
landlock: Add landlock_add_rule_fs and landlock_add_rule_net tracepoints
landlock: Add create_ruleset and free_ruleset tracepoints
landlock: Consolidate access-right and scope names in a shared header
landlock: Decouple the per-denial logging decision from CONFIG_AUDIT
landlock: Split denial logging from audit into common framework
landlock: Split struct landlock_domain from struct landlock_ruleset
landlock: Move domain query functions to domain.c
landlock: Prepare ruleset and domain type split
samples/landlock: Add LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_NO_NEW_PRIVS to sampler
...
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trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest
array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup()
holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while
unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the
synchronization point that must precede backend teardown.
The current order permits this interleaving:
CPU 0 CPU 1
trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted")
put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal()
kfree(digests) pcrlock()
unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests)
CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can
also be released before callbacks stop using it.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89
Call Trace:
tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]
trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]
trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]
__key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0
__key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50
__do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310
Allocated by task 88:
__kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490
do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390
do_init_module+0x2df/0x840
Freed by task 90:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted]
__do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510
Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops
new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the
backend state is destroyed.
Fixes: 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260731140925.2973492-1-nicoyip.dev@gmail.com
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Tested-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
|
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git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity updates from Mimi Zohar:
- TPM initialization is sometimes delayed until deferred_probe_initcall
Since ordering is not guaranteed within the same initcall level, IMA
may initialize before the TPM and fall back to TPM-bypass mode. A new
config option, CONFIG_IMA_INIT_LATE_SYNC, allows those building the
kernel to defer IMA initialization to late_initcall_sync, accepting
the integrity risk of missing early measurements in exchange for
avoiding TPM-bypass mode.
- The raw policy rules are now measured, as well as the complete
policy, closing a gap in integrity measurement coverage
* tag 'integrity-v7.3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
ima: measure userspace policy writes before parsing
ima: add critical data measurement for loaded policy
security: ima: rename boot_aggregate when ima is initialised at late_sync
security: ima: introduce IMA_INIT_LATE_SYNC option
security: lsm: allow LSMs to register for late_initcall_sync init
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|
Pull smack updates from Casey Schaufler:
- Spelling fix
- Code optimization in smackfs
- Fix credential mis-uses
- Place limits on two of the smackfs interfaces
* tag 'Smack-for-7.3' of https://github.com/cschaufler/smack-next:
smack: fix cred UAF in smack_file_send_sigiotask()
smack: restrict smackfs/{direct,mapped} values to 0-255
smack: deduplicate smackfs/{direct,mapped} file_operations
smack: show msgrcv() subject task in audit
smack: fix incorrect task context in smack_msg_queue_msgrcv
security: smack: fix spelling mistake
smack: simplify write handlers of sysfs entries
Smack: Fix error in capability bypass
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull LSM updates from Paul Moore:
- Remove task_euid()
The task_euid(), and Rust counterpart, was never widely used, for
good reason, and now that the only user is gone we're removing it to
rid ourselves of both dead and funky code.
- Documentation improvements
Correct some of the kdoc comments for security_task_prctl() and
clarify the rust comments on task UID accessors.
- Fix a memory leak in the LSM syscall selftests
* tag 'lsm-pr-20260814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm:
selftests/lsm: Fix memory leak in attr_lsm_count
cred: delete task_euid()
rust: task: clarify comments on task UID accessors
lsm: clarify security_task_prctl() hook documentation
|
|
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore:
- Convert a __get_free_page() call into a kmalloc() call
We had some very old code that called out to __get_free_page() for
allocating a pathname. There is no reason this couldn't be done with
a call to kmalloc() so we've done the conversion and now there is one
less __get_free_page() caller in the kernel.
- Limit the number of retired/unknown DCCP netlink messages
While DCCP is gone from the kernel, there are still userspace tools
which try to talk to the kernel about DCCP sockets which were
generating SELinux related log noise (unrecognized netlink message).
This pull request both limits the log messages to just the first
instance and also explains to the user that DCCP support has been
removed.
- Convert the SELinux strlcat() calls to seq_buf_XXX() calls
As part of the effort to drop the strlcat() API from the kernel, the
SELinux/IMA code was converted over to using seq_buf_XXX() calls.
- Only calculate the SELinux IMA configuration string length once
Previously each call to generate a SELinux configuration string for
IMA would have to calculate the length of the string. While the
contents of the string will likely change over the lifetime of the
system, the length of the string will not. Calculate the string
length once at boot and reuse the length value throughout the
lifetime of the system.
- Further validation of the SELinux policy at policy load time
Perform additional sanity checks on the policy constraints and types.
- Proper cleanup and error handling for selinuxfs init failures
We were not properly cleaning up some state in the case where
selinuxfs fails to initialize properly. It's somewhat of an academic
exercise as a failure to initialize selinuxfs will cause the system
to fail on boot, but it's arguably better to make sure we do things
the proper way.
- Various code cleanups
Convert integer flags to boolean types and drop an uncessary goto
from the SELinux code.
* tag 'selinux-pr-20260814' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux:
selinux: validate constraint expression attr and op at load time
selinux: compute the IMA configuration settings string length once at boot
selinux: replace strlcat() with seq_buf in selinux_ima_collect_state()
selinux: suppress warning flood for retired DCCP netlink messages
selinux: tighten type validation during policy load
selinux: drop unnecessary goto and label from avc_alloc_node()
selinux: convert int flags to bool flags in ss/services.c
selinux: clean up selinuxfs resources on init failure
selinux: hooks: use kmalloc() to allocate path buffer
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|
Scope and ptrace denials follow a different code path (a domain
hierarchy check) than access-right denials, so they need dedicated
tracepoints with type-specific TP_PROTO arguments. Complete the denial
coverage with:
- landlock_deny_ptrace: ptrace access denied by a domain hierarchy
mismatch.
- landlock_deny_scope_signal: signal delivery denied by
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL.
- landlock_deny_scope_abstract_unix_socket: abstract unix socket access
denied by LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET.
TP_PROTO passes the raw kernel object (struct task_struct or struct
sock) for eBPF BTF access; the comm and sun_path string fields use
__print_untrusted_str() because they hold untrusted input. Unlike the
deny_access events, these omit the blockers field: each maps to exactly
one denial type named by the event, so the bitmask would always be zero.
Like the deny_access events they carry same_exec and logged.
Audit logs the task-targeted denials with generic field names (opid,
ocomm), but a strongly typed trace event can use role-prefixed names
(tracee_pid/tracee_comm, target_pid/target_comm) that match the mainline
task-name convention (sched_process_fork's parent_comm/child_comm) and
say whose name each field holds; a bare comm= would collide across
events. The abstract-unix-socket event reports peer_pid instead, a
tracepoint-only field with no audit counterpart.
A scope or ptrace verdict compares the subject domain against the other
party's domain, so each event also reports that other party's Landlock
domain (tracee_domain=, target_domain=, or peer_domain=); the subject
domain= alone does not let a consumer redo domain_is_scoped() or
domain_ptrace(). It is reported as a scalar ID rather than a domain
pointer: a domain object is immutable, but the other task can replace
its credential and free the domain that credential referenced, so a
stored foreign pointer could dangle before the event is consumed. The
scalar ID also honors the tracepoint no-nullable-pointer rule, since the
other party is frequently unsandboxed. Passing the foreign domain
hierarchy object so an eBPF consumer could walk the other party's
ancestry live would lengthen the RCU section on the shared denial path
and needs a deferred refcount put, so it is left as a future
enhancement. The relational domain-ID field (tracee_domain,
target_domain, or peer_domain) is trace-only and is not added to audit
records, so audit's denial format is unchanged by this series.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811094338.288094-14-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
|
|
Add per-type tracepoints emitted from landlock_log_denial() when an
access is denied: landlock_deny_access_fs for filesystem denials and
landlock_deny_access_net for network denials. They use the "deny_"
prefix (rather than "check_") to mark that they fire only on a denial,
and they complement the check_rule events by making the
denial-by-absence case explicit (when no rule matches, no check_rule
event fires).
Unlike the audit records, these events fire regardless of the audit
configuration and the domain's log flags: the user's "disable logging"
intent applies to audit records, not to kernel tracing. The logged
field records whether the domain's log policy would submit the denial to
audit; it is the decision computed once by landlock_log_denial() and
passed to both the audit and the tracing emitter, so a stateless ftrace
filter can select the audit-visible denials with logged==1.
TP_PROTO passes the denying hierarchy node, not the task's current
domain, so domain_id reports the specific node that blocked the access,
matching audit record semantics. (check_rule instead passes the current
domain, which it needs to size its per-layer array.) same_exec is also
passed explicitly because it is computed from the credential bitmask and
is not derivable from the hierarchy pointer alone. The denial field is
named blockers to match the audit record field.
The filesystem path comes from the request's audit data. Its type
selects which union member holds the object, exactly as
dump_common_audit_data() selects it (a path, a file's path, an ioctl
op's path, or a bare dentry); reading the wrong member would dereference
garbage, so every reachable type has an explicit case and an unexpected
one is flagged with WARN_ONCE() instead of misread. Path-backed types
resolve via d_absolute_path() (as landlock_add_rule_fs does) and the
bare-dentry case via dentry_path_raw().
The inode number is read defensively. A filesystem denial can carry a
negative dentry (no backing inode), for example a denied creation, so
the event mirrors the guard in dump_common_audit_data() and reports
inode 0 rather than dereferencing a NULL inode. The sibling fs
tracepoints do not need the guard: a dentry that matches a rule during
an access check, or one opened to add a rule, always has a backing
inode. Landlock tracepoints are reachable by unprivileged sandboxees,
so a denial on a negative dentry with the event enabled must not fault
the kernel.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811094338.288094-13-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
|
|
Merge landlock_find_rule() into landlock_unmask_layers() so rule
pointers stay inside the domain implementation while unmask checking
gets the matched rule it needs for the check_rule tracepoint.
landlock_unmask_layers() now takes a landlock_id and the domain instead
of a rule pointer. A rename or link evaluates the same dentry against
both renamed parents, so this path now looks the rule up once per
parent; collapsing that back to a single lookup is left to a follow-up.
Emit, via the per-type wrappers unmask_layers_fs() and
unmask_layers_net(), the rights each matching rule grants at every
domain layer. The events carry this as a dynamic per-layer array (up to
LANDLOCK_MAX_NUM_LAYERS entries) reserved from the trace ring buffer,
not the caller's stack, and rendered symbolically per layer. A
WARN_ON_ONCE() in __trace_landlock_fill_layers() flags a rule whose
layer levels fall outside the domain range or are unsorted, a
cannot-happen case; the zero-filled slots keep the rendered output and
the array bounds safe regardless.
Setting allowed_parent2 to true for non-dom-check requests when
get_inode_id() returns false preserves the pre-refactoring behavior: a
negative dentry (no backing inode) has no matching rule, so the access
is allowed at this path component. Before the refactoring,
landlock_unmask_layers() with a NULL rule produced this result as a side
effect; now the caller must set it explicitly.
Name the trace-only check_rule fields so each printk label equals its
ring-buffer field name and works directly as an ftrace filter: the
request field is labelled access_request= and the per-layer array is
named grants. Values audit also logs keep audit's label (domain=,
ruleset=) so a single filter works across trace and audit.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811094338.288094-12-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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The landlock_create_domain event records that a domain was created,
once, before thread-sync. It cannot tell which threads end up enforcing
it: a successful landlock_restrict_self(2) with
LANDLOCK_RESTRICT_SELF_TSYNC applies the domain to the caller and every
eligible sibling. Creation (the operation) and enforcement (the
per-thread outcome) are distinct.
Add landlock_enforce_domain(domain, complete, process_wide), emitted
once per thread the domain is applied to, strictly after that thread's
commit_creds(), so it fires only for a thread that is enforcing the
domain, never speculatively; an aborted operation emits none. The
lifecycle now reads create -> enforce* -> free.
The two booleans name properties, not the implementation:
- complete: marks the single event that concludes the operation. It
names the outcome, the set is now enforced, not which thread
finishes, which the contract leaves unspecified.
- process_wide: means every eligible thread of the process is
covered. It is set race-free by either establishing path,
thread-sync or a single-threaded process, so
complete && process_wide is the whole-process-enforced guarantee.
The requesting thread and source ruleset are not repeated here: they are
on create_domain (joined via domain->hierarchy->id) and on the immutable
domain->hierarchy->details. Source ruleset means the ruleset_id and
ruleset_version recorded on create_domain, not the ruleset object, which
the caller may close before enforcement.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811094338.288094-11-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Add a landlock_create_domain tracepoint emitted from
landlock_restrict_self() after the new domain is created, so a consumer
can correlate the source ruleset with the resulting domain. The
flags-only path (ruleset_fd == -1) creates no domain and emits no event.
Move the ruleset lock acquisition from landlock_merge_ruleset() to the
caller so the lock is held across both the merge and the tracepoint
emission, giving an eBPF program a consistent ruleset snapshot. Release
it before the thread-sync: holding ruleset->lock across
landlock_restrict_sibling_threads() would deadlock a sibling blocked on
the same lock. The event therefore fires before the (rare) thread-sync
failure path; when that path aborts the just-created domain, the
matching free_domain event fires so the create/free pair stays balanced.
Add a landlock_free_domain tracepoint that fires when a domain's
hierarchy node is freed. The hierarchy node is the lifecycle boundary
because it represents the domain's identity and outlives the domain's
access masks, which may still be active in descendant domains.
A domain freed without ever being committed to a credential was never
visible to user space, so free_domain is suppressed for it. This is
tracked by a new landlock_log_status value, LANDLOCK_LOG_UNCOMMITTED,
which is also the zero value so a hierarchy whose initialization failed
defaults to not observable. A hierarchy is born UNCOMMITTED and is
promoted to LANDLOCK_LOG_PENDING (or LANDLOCK_LOG_DISABLED when logging
is off) right after its create_domain event fires; a thread-sync failure
does not reset it, so an aborted domain that already emitted
create_domain still emits the matching free_domain. Promoting right
after the event, rather than at commit_creds() time, avoids a race: on a
successful thread-sync the sibling threads commit the new domain in
lockstep before landlock_restrict_self() returns, so the shared domain
may already have moved to LANDLOCK_LOG_RECORDED through a plain store,
and a late promotion would race that store and could unbalance the
domain allocation and deallocation audit records.
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811094338.288094-10-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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Add tracepoints for Landlock rule addition, landlock_add_rule_fs for
filesystem rules and landlock_add_rule_net for network rules, so trace
consumers can correlate filesystem objects and network ports with their
rulesets. Both are emitted under the ruleset lock (asserted in
TP_fast_assign) so an eBPF program reads the ruleset, including the rule
just inserted, in a consistent snapshot.
Add a version field to struct landlock_ruleset, gated on
CONFIG_TRACEPOINTS like the id field and incremented under the ruleset
lock on each successful landlock_add_rule(2), including when it only
extends an existing rule's access rights. It fills the existing 4-byte
hole after usage, so the struct does not grow. Pairing the ruleset ID
with the version lets a later restrict_self event record the exact
ruleset revision merged into a domain.
Resolve the filesystem rule's absolute path with d_absolute_path()
rather than the d_path() audit uses: d_absolute_path() produces
namespace-independent paths that do not depend on the tracer's chroot
state, making trace output deterministic regardless of mount namespace
configuration. Distinguish the error cases as "<too_long>"
(-ENAMETOOLONG) and "<unreachable>" (anonymous files or detached
mounts).
Also add __trace_print_untrusted_str(), a static inline helper in the
header guarded by CREATE_TRACE_POINTS: it escapes separators, quotes,
backslashes, and non-printable bytes via string_escape_mem() so an
untrusted string (the path here, process names in later denial events)
cannot inject field separators or control characters into the ftrace
text output.
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: Justin Suess <utilityemal77@gmail.com>
Cc: Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Cc: Tingmao Wang <m@maowtm.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811094338.288094-9-mic@digikod.net
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
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